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The Formation of the Ulster Home Guard 
 
The story of the Home Guard in Great Britain is well-known; at least the popular memory of 
the organisation is, largely due to the success of the B.B.C. sitcom 'DG¶V$UP\. The Captain 
Mainwaring and Corporal Jones characters so often associated with the Home Guard in Great 
Britain were far removed from the reality of the force in Northern Ireland. By the simple fact 
that the Ulster Home Guard (originally the Ulster Defence Volunteers) was established as 
part of the Ulster Special Constabulary (U.S.C.) it was overwhelmingly of Protestants, 
attracting only small numbers of Catholics to aid in home defence operations. It was in many 
senses a re-emergence of the Protestant volunteering tradition.1 What will become clear, 
though, is that this was not the result of a deliberate policy undertaken by the Stormont 
government, despite criticisms to the contrary, mainly directed from outside of Northern 
Ireland. The government had taken steps to meet the most immediate danger in May 1940, a 
very real threat of invasion, and had done so at the expense of an entire section of the 
population, albeit not for the first time or the last. Criticism was also directed towards it by 
members of the Northern Ireland and Imperial Government because it was founded on very 
shaky constitutional ground. Strictly speaking the Stormont government had no legal right to 
form a force for home defence, but in the late spring of 1940, although political 
considerations played a part, from a military and organisational point of view, little choice 
existed if the government was to attempt to repel successfully an invasion on home shores. 
                                                          
1
 For more on the Protestant volunteering tradition of the seventeenth century onwards see D.W. 
0LOOHUµ1RQ-professional soldiery, c.1600-¶LQ7KRPDV%DUWOHWWDQG.HLWK-HIIHU\HGVA 
military history of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996), pp 316-17. For a full discussion of its re-emergence in 
the ODWHQLQHWHHQWKDQGHDUO\WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\VHH:0%XWOHUµ7KH,ULVKDPDWHXUPLOLWDU\WUDGLWLRQ
in the British army, c.1854-1945 (Ph.D. thesis, University of Kent, 2013). 
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This article will examine, firstly, the formation of the Ulster Home Guard and its relationship 
with the U.S.C.; secondly, the question of its religious composition; thirdly, the constitutional 




government, broadcast to the nation after the nine R¶FORFNQHZVRQ0D\four days 
after the launch of the German campaign in Western Europe, announcing the formation of the 
new Local Defence Volunteers (L.D.V.) in Great Britain. Northern Ireland was not included 
in the scheme. It has been noted that even before Eden finished speaking, men had begun to 
form queues outside police stations (many of which had not been given prior warning), not 
dissimilar to recruiting office queues of the First World War. The call was for men between 
seventeen and sixty-five with knowledge of firearms and capable of free movement. As many 
as 400,000 had answered this call by 1 June 1940.2 Importantly, in relation to the future force 
in Northern Ireland, the L.D.V. was raised in accordance with the military authorities and, 
crucially, was administered by the County Territorial Army Associations throughout the 
country. In Westminster, as early as 22 May, Sir Edward Grigg, (joint parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for War), outlined the detailed organisation of the new force stating that, 
The organisation is based upon the military organisation and is organised by areas like military 
commands. Each area has been sub-divided into zones, and each zone is sub-divided into groups, 
the groups into companies, and the companies into platoons and sections «0LOLWDU\DUHD
commanders, after consultation with the Lord Lieutenants of counties, for whose co-operation we 
                                                          
2
 I. F. W. Beckett, The amateur military tradition 1558-1945 (Manchester, 1991), p.266. For a full 
description of the raising of the L.D.V. see S. P. Mackenzie, The Home Guard (Oxford, 1995), pp 33-
51. 
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are grateful, and also with the chairmen of county councils and other local authorities of that 
kind, have appointed voluntary area organisers, who in turn have appointed the zone organisers, 
and so on down the chain.3 
In Northern Ireland the only County Territorial Army Association was the small association 
which existed in County Antrim, only recently established ± in 1938 ± which could not hope 
to cope with administering a new military force for the entire province, a fact that was 
discussed and recognised quite readily by those in Stormont.4 
Indeed, as might be clear from the decision to exclude Northern Ireland from the 
L.D.V. scheme, the British government placed much less importance upon the defence of 
Irish shores than it did on those of Great Britain. Indeed, J.W. Blake subsequently remarked 
that as early as 1937 the British conception of strategy placed little importance on the defence 
of Northern Ireland.5 It was not until the retreat from Dunkirk in June 1940 that special land 
and air commands were established in the province, these being responsible for the local 
control of active operations in the event of invasion. Plans were eventually drawn up for the 
defence of the whole of Ireland against German attack, based upon the forces immediately 
deployable in Northern Ireland. At this critical stage these amounted only to one, the 53rd 
Division, supported by the North Irish Horse, and the home service and anti-aircraft units, all 
of whom had only recently been established and were based in initial training camps, full of 
untrained men who were hardly capable of putting up a formidable fight. As John Blake 
remarked, the military resources of the United Kingdom during the summer of 1940 were 
                                                          
3
 Hansard 5 (Commons), ccclxi, 238-76 (22 May 1940).  
4
 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War to the War Cabinet Legislation Committee, 5 March 
1942, (T.N.A., Cabinet minutes, CAB/75/14); notes on the formation of the Ulster Home Guard, 1945 
(P.R.O.N.I. Cabinet conclusions, CAB/3/A/77). For the L.D.V. in Great Britain see Beckett, Amateur 
military tradition, pp 266-7; Mackenzie, Home Guard, pp 33-7.   
5
 J. W. Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War (Belfast, 1956), p.59. 
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perilously slender, so the view was taken that the maximum possible strength should be 
retained in Great Britain.6 With this in mind, it is hardly surprising that the army was 
unwilling to take on additional untrained men in an L.D.V. organisation based in Northern 
Ireland; it simply was not a priority for them.  
+RZHYHU1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶VSULPHPLQLVWHU, Lord Craigavon, was adamant that a 
scheme of home defence comparable to the L.D.V. should be extended to Northern Ireland.  
He had to hand a force which, structurally, was not unlike that of the newly formed L.D.V., 
as outlined by Grigg, and which would be used in the formation of the Ulster Home Guard 
(U.H.G.): the Ulster Special Constabulary (U.S.C.). During the immediate period after 
partition, the U.S.C. was established in Northern Ireland as a means to provide an aid to the 
civil power. It consisted of four sections: the µA¶ Specials, a full-time paid force; the µB¶ 
Specials, which trained on a part-time basis; the µC¶ Specials, which consisted of unpaid, 
ununiformed reservists; and the µC1¶ Specials, consisting of non-active men who would be 
called out only during emergencies. The U.S.C. was paid for and controlled entirely by the 
unionist government. 7 As demonstrated by Timothy Bowman, this force swiftly came to be 
made up of former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (U.V.F.) and quickly became an 
outlet for unionist political patronage, not a force inclusive of all sections of the population.8 
Although there were no formal blocks on Catholic membership, in practice it was almost an 
                                                          
6
 Ibid., pp 155-60. This includes a fuller discussion of plans should an invasion have occurred from 
the South.  
7
 For more on the formation of the U.S.C. see Michael Farrell, Arming the Protestants: the formation 
of the Ulster Special Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary 1920-27 (London, 1983), pp 
38-46; Arthur Hezlet, 7KHµ%¶6SHFLDOVDKLVWRU\RIWKH8OVWHU6SHFLDO&RQVWDEXODU\ (London, 1972), 
p. 20. 
8
 Timothy Bowman, &DUVRQ¶V$UP\WKH8OVWHU9ROXQWHHU)RUFH-22 (Manchester, 2007), pp 
190-201.  
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entirely Protestant force right up until its disbandment after the Hunt Committee Report in 
1969. The U.S.C. was a µIRUPLGDEOH¶IRUFHwell-armed with rifles, revolvers, and machine-
guns, trained with these weapons and holding regular drills even during quiet periods.9  The 
µB¶ Specials were organised into districts and sub-districts which had their own 
commandants, and most were grouped around towns and even small villages in order to allow 
for a greater degree of control at a local level.10  
The L.D.V. in Great Britain contained a very high proportion of men with previous 
military experience, most of whom had seen action during the First World War and, as a 
result, already had a degree of military training. In some cases, entire units were composed of 
war veterans.11 In Northern Ireland, this would not be the case, particularly because the 
number of men who had served during the First World War was much smaller than that of 
Great Britain. Though many of those who had served during that conflict were either existing 
or previous members of the U.S.C., and some of these men would be the driving force behind 
forming independent defence organisations prior to introduction of the official scheme, they 
did not dominate it.12 Given the high degree of training, abundance of equipment, structural 
similarities to the scheme outlined by Grigg, and the lack of any substantial Territorial 
Association to handle the task, it is hardly surprising that this ready-made force was selected 
by Craigavon as the basis for the U.H.G. in May 1940. 
                                                          
9
 Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: the Orange State (London, 1980), pp 95-6. 
10
 Farrell, Arming the Protestants, p. 45. 
11
 Beckett, Amateur military tradition, pp 269-70; Mackenzie, Home Guard, pp 37-8; Summerfield 
and Peniston-Bird, Contesting Home Defence, pp 28-30.   
12
 Belfast Newsletter, 18 June 1940; Newry Reporter, 22 June 1940; Belfast Weekly Telegraph, 29 
June 1940; transcript of a UDGLREURDGFDVWE\0DMRU0D\µ7RGD\LQ8OVWHU¶, 19 Feb. 1942 (P.R.O.N.I. 
LA/7/3H/11).   
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Within a week of the initial announcement of the formation of the L.D.V., Craigavon 
discussed, in the Northern Ireland cabinet, the possibility of informing the press that a similar 
VFKHPHFRXOGEHH[WHQGHGWR8OVWHU+HVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKHDUUDQJHPHQWIRUWKHµGHIHQFH
DJDLQVWSDUDFKXWHWURRSV¶ZRXOGIDOOWRDQHZO\FUHDWHGVHFWLRQRIWKHµB¶ 6SHFLDOVµZKRZHUH
DGPLUDEO\VXLWHGIRUWKLVZRUN¶13 Even at this early stage Craigavon stated that there were 
µJUDYHREMHFWLRQV¶outside Northern Ireland to an arrangement along similar lines to that in 
Great Britain.14 Yet this did not act as a deterrent. Two days later, on 22 May, Craigavon 
indicated in Stormont that such a force would be inaugurated, though the details were as yet 
vague.15 Clearly he was intent on going ahead with an independent home defence scheme 
without the initial support (or consent) of the Imperial government. He did not, in fact, visit 
London until 23 May where, it appears at this stage, no objection was made by Churchill to 
the establishment of the force, and on his return to Northern Ireland Craigavon claimed that 
his government had been entrusted with the task of raising a local defence corps.16 
Constitutionally, however, this was a problem, and if it was not recognised at the time, it 
would raise some serious questions later, particularly because the Stormont government had 
no authority over defence policy even though it was responsible for law and order in 
Northern Ireland..  
Even so, by 25 May the Cabinet had decided to begin recruitment of a corps of 
defence volunteers, using the µB¶ Specials as its nucleus, and expanded by the recruitment of 
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 Hansard N.I. (Commons), xxiii, 1211-13 (22 May 1940).  
16
 Robert Fisk, In time of war; Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality, 1939-45 (London, 1985), 
p.158; Northern Ireland Cabinet conclusion by Lord Craigavon (P.R.O.N.I. Cabinet papers, 
CAB/9/CD/169/1). 
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µVXLWDEOHDSSOLFDQWV¶E\WKHsub-commandants.  This expanded force would come under the 
control of Sir Charles Wickham, Inspector-General of the U.S.C.17 The pace of events meant 
that the decision-making process behind the new home defence formation was rapid, 
necessarily so given the speed of the German advance in Europe and the urgency associated 
with a potential invasion. By the time Craigavon made the first detailed announcement 
Stormont on 28 May, the prime minister has already visited London and consulted with 
various ministers, and with the War Office, regarding the decision to independently form 
home defence units. Arrangements had been agreed with the Imperial authorities which stated 
that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.) and the U.S.C. would undertake the duty of 
home defence, in addition to their normal constabulary responsibilities. An explicit 
distinction was to be made in relation to the new Ulster Defence Volunteer section. The main 
R.U.C. and U.S.C. would carry out home defence duties, as well as deal with ordinary crime. 
The new section, however, would be confined only to home defence and would not be used 
as an aid to the civil power ± a significant difference in this context.18  
The new volunteers would be unpaid (unlike regular U.S.C. constables), could resign 
with fourteen GD\V¶Qotice; and would not be required to give full-time service, live away 
from their homes, or enrol for a period exceeding the war. Recruitment would be undertaken 
by the county commandants, who would be required to make local arrangements for the 
enrolment of volunteers.19 This was, of course, a pragmatic approach to the whole system of 
enrolment. As the British authorities had relied on the already existing mechanism of the 
County Territorial Army Associations, so the Northern Irish authorities used the existing 
U.S.C. organisation and structures. The negative effect of this was that any pre-existing 
                                                          
17
 Northern Ireland cabinet conclusions, 25 May 1940 (P.R.O.N.I., CAB/9/CD/169/1). 
18
 Hansard N.I. (Commons), xxiii, 1256-7 (28 May 1940). 
19
 Ibid. 
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biases within the U.S.C. at a local level were also prevalent and apparent in the new 
volunteers, leading to a similarly negative effect on Catholic recruitment.  Yet using 
alternative mechanisms, such as the ex-VHUYLFHPHQ¶VDVVRFLDWLRQWKH%ULWLVK/HJLRQZRXOG
have required the creation of a detailed structure from scratch.  
In fact, WKHXVHRIYHWHUDQV¶DVVRFLDWLRQV had been raised at the cabinet meeting on 25 
May.  A letter tabled by the cabinet secretary, Robert Gransden, advocated the use of Old 
Comrades¶ Associations in recruitment, but also noted the possibility of absorbing them 
directly into the U.S.C. for home defence purposes. It mentioned the existence of associations 
linked to specific battalions of the *UHDW:DU¶V36th (Ulster) Division, and of associations of 
ex-servicemen of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and Royal Irish Fusiliers. As an example it 
noted that the 13th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles Association consisted of area organisers across 
County Down, many of whom were ex-N.C.O.s, and that it consistently turned out 400 men 
at parades, all of whom had war service. The 11th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles Association, 
which had only been in existence for a year, had recently turned out 500 men in County 
Antrim.20 Of course, this was not dissimilar to the independent formations set up across Great 
Britain, also based around veteran associations, which were so important during the early 
days of the L.D.V. By the last days of May the majority of these organisations in Northern 
Ireland had indeed been absorbed into the Ulster Defence Volunteers section of the U.S.C. 
(although, curiously, others continued to spring up independently, such as that recruited by 
the British Legion in Rathfriland, County Down as late as the end of June 1940).21  
3KLOLS2OOHUHQVKDZKDVUHFHQWO\VXJJHVWHGWKDW&UDLJDYRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRUDLVHWKH
volunteers as part of the U.S.C. was an explosive response to British attempts at negotiation 
                                                          
20
 Letter from D.C. Lindsay to Gransden, 25 May 1940 (P.R.O.N.I., CAB/9/CD/169/1); Belfast 
Weekly Telegraph, 29 June 1940. 
21
 Newry Reporter, 22 June 1940. 
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with De Valera, and was a way to keep control firmly in Belfast.22 Moreover, Craigavon had 
EHHQJLYHQDµGUHVVLQJGRZQ¶GXULQJDPHHWLQJ in June with British representatives over his 
uncompromising stance towards Éire. His decision to attempt to raise a force through the 
U.S.C. risked damaging British negotiations with Éire over its neutrality. It is logical that the 
British wished to distance themselves from potential involvement with a sectarian force, and 
any associated criticism and scepticism from Eire.23 The British authorities were particularly 
keen to stress the importance of a coordinated defensive plan with Éire should an invasion 
occur. In fact it was envisaged that if Germany invaded Éire, the 53rd Division would strike 
from the north, whilst a brigade of Royal Marines would seize a bridgehead in Éire, from 
Milford Haven in Wales, through which reinforcements could be introduced. 24 The 
authorities recognised that this would be a tricky policy to sell, especially if units from 
Northern Ireland were involved, given the strong anti-partitionist feelings which existed in 
the south at the time.25 
                                                          
22
 Philip Ollerenshaw, Northern Ireland in the Second World War: politics, economic mobilisation 
and society, 1939-45 (Manchester, 2013), pp 145-6. 
23
 Ibid., p.146; John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-1973 (Oxford, 1989), pp 220-
33. Indeed, as Charles Wickham later admitted when putting together notes for the official history of 
the Home *XDUGµWKH:DU2IILFHZRXOGQRWUDLVHWKH/'9KHUHEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHDIUDLGRIJHWWLQJ
LQYROYHGLQORFDOSROLWLFDODQGVHFWDULDQGLIIHUHQFHV«7KHRQO\ZD\RIJHWWLQJLWGRQHTXLFNO\ZDVWR
XVHWKHIUDPHZRUNDQGPDFKLQHU\RIWKH6SHFLDO&RQVWDEXODU\¶Oetter from Wickham to H. C. 
Montgomery, 5 Feb. 1943 (P.R.O.N.I. HA/32/1/794). In a handwritten note at the side of the letter, 
ZKLFKKDGEHHQGLVWULEXWHGWRWKH%ULWLVKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVFRPSLOLQJWKHKLVWRU\LWZDVZULWWHQWKDWµZH
NQRZWKLVEXWZRQ¶WSXWthis sort of thing in a book about the Home Guard. We want to avoid, as far 
DVSRVVLEOHDQ\VWUHVVLQJRIWKH6SHFLDO&RQVWDEXODU\FRQQHFWLRQ¶ 
24
 Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, p.157. 
25
 See Michael Kennedy, Division and consensus: the politics of cross-border relations in Ireland, 
1925-1969 (Dublin, 2000), pp 70-91; Stephen Kelly, Fianna Fail, partition and Northern Ireland, 
1926-1971 (Dublin, 2013), pp 93-106. 
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These consideration must have influenced matters of home defence but it remains 
clear that Craigavon simply had no other mechanism open for recruiting a new defence force 
than reliance upon the U.S.C. The army was in no position to provide any additional support 
across the Irish Sea, and, judging by his actions in Stormont and the Cabinet, Craigavon was 
intent on taking up responsibility for home defence entirely from within Northern Ireland.26 
No doubt this was consequently a relief to the military authorities, who by this point were 
incapable of defending the south coast of England, let alone anywhere else. 7KHµRSHQ
IURQWLHU¶with the south RQO\PDGHPDWWHUVZRUVHHVSHFLDOO\EHFDXVHRIWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUµILIWK
FROXPQLVWV¶LQWKHIRUPRIWKH,.R.A.  It had begun operating with much more intensity 
between February and April 1940, and there was evidence to suggest that its leaders might 
seize the opportunity of invasion to damage the war effort.27 As a result of this Wickham was 
very protective of the µB¶ Specials and concerned about recruitment from it to the armed 
forces, given its significance for the internal defence of the region.28 )URP6WRUPRQW¶VSRLQW
of view, then, the best solution was to vest in itself control over any home defence force. 
Retaining control of internal security, also meant ensuring that weapons only fell into the 




There was no formal policy against Catholics joining the Ulster Home Guard, but 
much like the U.S.C. during the interwar period, Catholics did not join in any significant 
numbers, even at the outset.  Some of the reasons for this are perhaps obvious, not least 
                                                          
26
 Northern Ireland cabinet conclusions, 25 May 1940 (P.R.O.N.I., CAB/9/CD/169/1). 
27
 Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, p. 171. 
28
 Ollerenshaw, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, p. 31. 
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because the U.S.C. was composed overwhelmingly of Protestants. Within days of the 
announcement of its formation, the Irish News, a nationalist newspaper, wrote of the new 
force, that it was 
unfortunate in formation and on the lines it is run, [and] cannot possess the confidence of the 
whole people, despite the statement to the contrary by the Premier. A sectarian organisation, its 
bias has been exemplified on many occasions; of narrow loyalties, it will have to overcome these 
in the performance of the wider duties that are now to be entrusted to it if these are to be 
discharged satisfactorily. Can it rise to such heights?29 
Two days later, withdrawal of support for the force was announced by the Northern Ireland 
/DERXU3DUW\DVLWZDVIHOWWKDWµDVORQJDVWKH³%´6SHFLDOVFRQVWLWXWHWKHEDVLVRIWKHIRUFH
WKHUHZLOOQRWEHDXQLWHGIURQWZKLFKLVQHFHVVDU\LIWKHVFKHPHLVWREHDVXFFHVV¶30 This 
withdrawal of support was followed by statements in Stormont. John Campbell, the 
nationalist M.P. for Belfast Central, in a lengthy speech regarding the formation of the 
U.H.G., noted WKDWµQRRQHFDQGLVSXWHWKHVDOLHQWIDFWWKDWWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH³%´
Specials is unquestionably sectarian. I wouOGDGGWKDWWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH³%´6SHFLDOVLV
XQTXHVWLRQDEO\SROLWLFDO¶31 Campbell also took note of what the Minister of Agriculture, Sir 
%DVLO%URRNHKDGVDLGUHJDUGLQJWKHDGPLWWDQFHRIRQO\µOR\DO¶PHQWRWKHU.H.G., an 
important point. He went oQWRVD\WKDWµLIDPDQLVD&DWKROLFRUD1DWLRQDOLVWLVKHE\WKDW
very fact disqualified? A disloyal man is a man who does not vote with the Government. Just 
                                                          
29
 Irish News, 29 May 1940. 
30
 Ibid., 31 May 1940. Although the newspaper did not support the formation of the U.H.G., this same 
issue did carry advertisements for the newly formed home defence battalions of Northern Ireland, 
which was under the control of the British Army. 
31
 Hansard N.I. (Commons), xxiii, 1347-52 (4 June 1940). 
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as the Government will not give the Catholics more than one-tenth of the public money 
available for school-EXLOGLQJVRKHUHWKH\ZLOOQRWWUXVW&DWKROLFVZLWKGHIHQVLYHDUPV¶32 
 A week later, Campbell reiterated the point that to a large section of the population in 
Northern Ireland, the county commandants in charge of recruiting, and the force under them, 
were sectarian and political in character. Without irony, the prime minister replied that the 
force was µYHU\OR\DO¶EXWalso mentioned the particular difficulties of the political situation 
in Northern Ireland . William Lowry, parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, commented on the problem of handing out arms and taking in men to the force 
µLQGLVFULPLQDWHO\¶%\WKDWKHmeant, of course, the risk of handing weapons to possible 
members of the I.R.A. and he felt that county commandants were the best judges of the 
character of potential recruits.33 The perceived risk from the I.R.A. had some substance, as 
information received in July 1940 detailed I.R.A. plans to disarm or infiltrate the U.H.G. 
when it was on training or patrol, and these reports continued to surface throughout the war.34 
 The power of the county commandants to recruit the force left it open to justified 
criticisms. Cases of alleged religious discrimination did occur. At the end of July 1940, Jack 
Beattie, Labour M.P. for Belfast East, presented an example. He stated that because his local 
U.H.G. platoon was equipped with a Lewis gun, he had asked Alexander Stafford, a former 
N.C.O. in the Gordon Highlanders, ZLWKWZHOYH\HDUV¶VHUYLFHDQGLQSRssession of a 
machine gun instrucWRU¶VFHUWLILFDWHWRMRLQWKHSODWRRQStafford was rejected by the local 
commandant because he was a Catholic. Beattie indicated that the commandant had said that 
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ex-servicemen in the British Legion and thirty-nine of them had volunteered to serve in the 
U.H.G., the majority Catholics. Of these, only six had been enrolled after their names and 
DGGUHVVHVKDGEHHQSDVVHGRQWRWKHORFDOFRPPDQGDQWZKRDOVRVDLGWKDWKHµGLGQRWZDQW
ex-VHUYLFHPHQHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHZKRZHUHSDSLVKHV¶35 
 It was not just during the initial months of the formation of the U.H.G. that 
accusations were made with regard to the blocking of Catholic applicants to the force, or 
indeed, of attempts made to expel men for this reason. Examples continued to surface as late 
as 1943 when a complaint was made directly to John Andrews who, by this point, had been 
appointed Prime Minister. A vacancy for an instructor had arisen in a battalion of the Home 
*XDUGLQ&RXQW\7\URQHDQGLWKDGEHHQVXJJHVWHGWKDW&RORQHO0F&DUWK\2¶/HDU\VKRXOG be 
appointed because of his prior experience in the regular army. Mr J.A. Gregg, the author of a 
letter objecting to this appointment, stated WKDW2¶/HDU\ZDV 
a Roman Catholic and not only that, he is a native of Southern Ireland: all these points have come 
up at a sitting of our club of Apprentice Boys sitting in Beragh Orange Hall. All the members of 
the club are Home Guard. After many different opinions it was finally agreed that one of our own 
religion should get the position as it was very bad if there was not an old comrade of the Ulster 
Division who was not able to fill the position, and an Ulsterman «:HFDQVHHWKDWWKH5RPDQ
Catholic is trying to push themselves in at the head of all good government jobs and they are able 
WRPDNHDIRRORIDJRRGPDQ\RIRXUIULHQGVWKURXJKWKHLUFLYLOLW\EXWZHZRQ¶WKDYHLWKHUHLQ
Beragh, we say not an inch and no surrender.36 
This clearly suggests the political leanings of at least some of the Home Guard, regardless of 
DQ\XVH&RORQHO2¶/HDU\ZRXOGKDYHEHHQWRWKHIRUFH*UHJJZDVUHPLQGHGWKDW2¶/HDU\
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was in fact a distinguished officer who had won a Distinguished Service Order with Bar and a 
Military Cross, spending most of his time in an Ulster Regiment, as well as commanding a 
battalion of the Ulster Division during the First World War. The complaint was dealt with by 
the authorities in an unsympathetic way. H.C. Montgomery, secretary to the Department of 
Home Affairs, explained to Gransden that the U.H.G. FRXOGFRQVLGHUWKHPVHOYHVµOXFN\LQ
KDYLQJWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIDPDQOLNHWKLV¶DQGWKHPDWWHUZDVODLGWRUHVW. It is unclear whether 
2¶/HDU\ZDVHYHQWXDOO\permitted to join the U.H.G.37 This case is noteworthy for it 
illustrates how sectarianism in relation to recruitment arose from local circumstances rather 
than government policy. 
 Nevertheless, it is hardly surprising that so few Catholics joined the U.H.G. In March 
1941, the British government strongly pressed Stormont to provide a figure on Catholic 
participation in the force. When presenting the information to Westminster, Stormont 
officials explained that the organisation was always intended to include Protestants and 
&DWKROLFVµZKRVHOR\DOW\ZDVEH\RQGVXVSLFLRQ¶DQGWKDWPHPEHUVRIWKHIRUFHZHUHQRW
asked for their religion when meant that a precise figure could not be given. As far as the 
authorities could judge, however, there were no more than 150 Catholics in the force, mainly 
concentrated in Newry, northern Antrim, Londonderry, and some areas of Tyrone. It was 
admitted that because the total strength of the force was 26,000, this number of Catholics was 
µLQFRQVLGHUDEOH¶38 Moreover, in comparison, it was estimated by the authorities that in the 
previous month twenty five per cent of officers and at least sixteen per cent of the total 
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strength of the R.U.C. were Catholic. There was no hiding behind these figures ± the U.H.G. 
was a Protestant force, one that through its mechanism of recruitment had actively 




 Enrolling men as part of the police force for the task of home defence also brought up an 
important point regarding its legal position should an invasion occur. Stormont officials and 
army representatives had concerns that members of the U.S.C., both old and new, would be 
regarded as francs-tireurs by the enemy and subject to execution under the laws of war. At an 
early stage Craigavon stated, rather vaguely, that in the event of an invasion all members of 
the police force would come under the command of the military, resulting in them being 
classed as military combatants, and not civilian police.39 Questions were raised as to the 
possibility of carrying out this task as it was believed that an act of parliament was required.40 
Craigavon appears to have been ready for this suggestion and believed that he had already 
carried out the appropriate steps. In fact, whilst in London in May 1940 he had arranged a 
means for the incorporation of R.U.C. and U.S.C. personnel into the military. All members of 
the forces would be equired to re-attest, essentially to resign and re-join, and once this was 
done they would become legal combatants.41 
For some this explanation was not satisfactory. John Campbell, for example, wished it 
to be made clear that the prime mLQLVWHU¶VSURSRVDOVZHUHUDWKHUDPELJXRXVDQGREVFXUHLQ
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certain matters, most of all that of the question of civilian or military control. He took 
particular issue with the position of the U.H.G. in the event of an invasion stating that, 
The force as set forth by the Prime Minister is in a sense a hybrid one under dual control, part civil 
and part military. I dare say there was great difficulty knowing where the control of the military 
authorities begins and where the control of the civil authority ends. That is to say in this particular 
case where the control of the authorities at Stormont ends and where the control of the War Office 
begins. Reading as well as I can between the lines, I think the last word is with Stormont.42  
In response, Craigavon stated that in the event of an invasion the specific point of transfer 
would not be an issue because KHGLGQRWEHOLHYHWKDWµLISDUDFKXWLVWVFRPHGRZQLQ&RXQW\
Tyrone the men will stop and discuss their rights; whether they will act as Specials or as the 
RWKHUFRUSV¶DQGWKDWLIZDUGLGFRPHWRWKHVKRUHVRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGWKHQPDUWLDOODZ
would take precedent over civil authority at any rate.43 
Little more was said publicly on this matter over the summer as the newly raised 
volunteers carried out training and their new duties as best they could. In private, however, 
J.C. MacDermott, the Minister for Public Security, was continually anxious about the 
position of the volunteers and U.S.C., both constitutionally and under military law. In 
correspondence with Major-General Sir William Thomson, Northern Ireland District, 
MacDermott stated that when the defence volunteers were formed initial planning revolved 
around the ability to repel the enemy. The likelihood, however, was that before this role was 
required, the internal situation would become much more difficult, stretching the capabilities 
of the police.. He specified that 
It is generally accepted that if an acute emergency arises, the role of the Local Defence Volunteer 
Section of the Special Constabulary, and probably also of a large part of the old B¶ Special 
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Constabulary, will be a military and not police role. I am accordingly, anxious that the basis of the 
organisation and training of the new force should be along military and not police lines. This is 
important too on the grounds of broad political considerations.44 
It was the constitutional position that bothered MacDermott most. Based on later interviews 
with MacDermott, Robert Fisk has claimed that he continually pressed the Cabinet to make a 
more definite arrangement for the U.S.C. MacDermott wanted responsibility for the force to 
be transferred to Westminster, but given the opinion of Major-General Ridley Pakenham-
Walsh, General Officer Commanding (G.O.C.), Northern Ireland District, was that separating 
the defence volunteers from the U.S.C. µZRXOGEHGLVDVWURXV¶WKLVVXJJHVWLRQZDVQRW
pursued.45 Pakenham-Walsh stated that a strong framework already existed, suited to the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGWKDWDWUDQVIHURISRZHUWRWKHDUP\PLJKWPHDQWKDWµXQGHVLUDEOH
HOHPHQWV¶would be given access to weapons as the military could not carefully screen 
applicants in the way that the U.S.C. could.46 MacDermott believed that the Northern Ireland 
government had no power to raise a military force under the Government of Ireland Act of 
1920, but later claimed that at the time nobody minded because of the immediate emergency; 
WKH\ZHUHDVKHSXWLWµOHJLVODWLQJEH\RQGWKHLU FDSDELOLW\¶47 It may, of course, be argued 
that the Stormont government had previously introduced comparable measures: the µC¶ 
Division of the U.S.C. closely resembled an infantry division, though not officially 
sanctioned as one.48 
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 If the constitutional position concerned MacDermott most, the perceived sectarian 
problems bothered others more, especially those outside the Northern Ireland establishment. 
MacDermott subsequently maintained that the volunteers were quite sectarian, but this was 
because the µB¶ 6SHFLDOVZHUHµEDGLQSDUWV¶DQGWKDWWKHdenominational imbalance was 
largely the fault of the minority Catholics for not joining.49 Others certainly did not see it this 
way and on 23 September 1940 a very public memorial letter was sent to Winston Churchill 
and other important political figures. It was signed by twenty-two influential figures, of 
Anglo-Irish background, including many unionists, and headed by the retired General Sir 
Hubert Gough. The letter stated that: 
In Northern Ireland the provincial Government has been permitted to raise, arm, equip and control 
a force to perform the duties as to defence against invasion which are performed in the remainder 
of the United Kingdom by the Home Guard under military supervision and control. By an 
unfortunate expedient this new force in Northern Ireland, termed the Ulster Defence Volunteers, 
has been embodied as a branch of the µB¶ Special Constabulary of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 
By this one fact it has at once become identified with all the most bitter sectarian and political 
differences which have long divided Northern Ireland opinion. Its enrolment has been largely 
governed by considerations of religion and politics which would naturally be absent if it had been 
conducted on normal lines by the British War Office or under its direction. It has thus incurred the 
odium attaching to a political police force of a type familiar on the Continent of Europe rather than 
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the general popularity and respect possessed in full measure by the Home Guard throughout the 
remainder of the United Kingdom.50 
The letter was also published in a number of British newspapers, which caused the Stormont 
government to initiate a form of damage control. Within three days, MacDermott had 
prepared a memorandum for the Northern Ireland Cabinet which proposed that the name of 
WKHIRUFHVKRXOGEHFKDQJHGWRWKH8OVWHU+RPH*XDUGµVRDVWRDYRLGDQ\FRQIXVion over it 
EHLQJDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHSROLFHIRUFH¶$GGLWLRQDOO\LWZDVUHLWHUDWHGWKDWthe men were 
enrolled as Special Constables, not as members of the armed forces, but, nevertheless, that 
they would come under military control should the need arise.51 By 7 October, the Northern 
Ireland Cabinet Secretary had written to Churchill stating that if anyone was aware of any 
cases in which there was a reason to suppose that discrimination had occurred against 
individuals, either with regard to them being permitted to join the force, or after they had 
joined it, then the Northern Ireland government was prepared to look into these cases with a 
view to removing any cause for complaint.52 Other than this concession the Stormont 
government was unwavering. 
 From London, Charles Markbreiter, the Home Office official responsible for Northern 
,UHODQGVXJJHVWHGWKDWWRDSSHDVHWKHPHPRULDOLVWVLWPLJKWEHEHVWWRH[SODLQWKDWµEHFDXVHRI
the situation as it was last summer it was necessary to raise forthwith a force which could be 
ready for immediate action, and that in Northern Ireland no other method was available 
H[FHSWWRPDNHXVHRIWKHH[LVWLQJIRUFHRI6SHFLDO&RQVWDEOHVDVDQXFOHXV¶53 Markbreiter 
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felt that this would completely satisfy the memorialists and believed that it could be 
H[SODLQHGWR&KXUFKLOOWKDWµZKHUHDVLQ(QJODQGDIRUFHFRXOGEHFUHDWHGDWYHU\VKRUWQRWLFH
by the method of inviting individual applications, this was not so in Northern Ireland «
since, unless one was to make use of a body which was already accepted as a proved loyalty, 
LWZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\WRYHWHDFKLQGLYLGXDODSSOLFDWLRQ¶54  
 Gransden stated that it was reiterated frequently that necessity had called for the 
U.H.G. to be raised as part of the U.S.C., as this force could be made ready for action almost 
immediately. It was argued that discrimination had to occur, especially in relation to the 
GLVWULEXWLRQRIDUPVEHFDXVHRIWKHSUHVHQFHRIµVXEYHUVLYHHOHPHQWV¶,WZDVLQGLFDWHGWKDWD
µERG\RIPHQRISURYHGOR\DOW\¶KDGWREHUDLVHG55  Rather unfortunately the coats that had 
been ordered for the U.H.G., and which were supposed to be dark green in colour to match 
the trousers, had turned out to be black, causing further dismay due to an appearance 
UHPLQLVFHQWRIWKHFRQWURYHUVLDOµ%ODFNDQG7DQV¶RIWZHQW\\HDUVSUHYLRXVO\ Furthermore, 
doubts had been cast as to the willingness of men within the force to transfer from civilian to 
military control.56  
 Only a few days after the memorial letter had been published, MacDermott had 
pointed out that after the first rush of enlistments, there was a strong possibility that pro-
constabulary and pro-military elements would emerge in more rural areas over the coming 
winter.57 This he reckoned to be likely because of the way in which the units had been raised 
in particular areas. Whilst the U.S.C. structure had been used for recruitment, in Belfast for 
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example, the U.H.G. section as raised was completely separated from the µB¶ Specials; as a 
result many of these men wanted military control. However, in other areas, particularly in the 
west, the U.H.G. sections had been formed in parallel to U.S.C. platoons. This meant that the 
two were much more closely intertwined, making it more difficult to take them away from 
the constabulary structure. Wickham went as far as to say that it was mainly in Belfast and 
some small towns that a change to military control was wanted, and this was men in these 
areas ZHUHµFODPRXULQJWREHFRPHVROGLHUV¶58 
 The many facets of the issue of control remained contentious into November 1940 as 
it appears that some in Westminster, and most especially MacDermott, were determined not 
to let the matter rest. He even appears to have persuaded the Stormont Cabinet that 
transferring control of the U.H.G. to the army was the best option. Pakenham-Walsh had 
other ideas and reminded MacDermott that, if the War Office gained control of the 




essential the ArP\VKRXOGDYRLG¶59 MacDermott informed John Andrews of Pakenham-
:DOVK¶V position but told Andrews that he did not see how the military would be involving 
itself in a political issue because it had already used the police reports on recruits for the 
regular army.60 What MacDermott had failed to appreciate, however, was the inherent 
differences between screening recruits for the regular armed forces and for the U.H.G. The 
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Stormont authorities felt that they needed to be over cautious about allowing Catholic men to 
join the latter, because of their potential for I.R.A. involvement, and concern that, since 
U.H.G. members were required to store their arms at home, this carried the risked of them 
getting into the wrong hands.  
 Despite this, in the early days of 1941, discussions on this matter re-emerged in 
Westminster, mainly reiterating the memorial letter of the previous September, and it 
continued to be viewed as an important and difficult problem. Herbert Morrison, the British 
Home Secretary, felt that the Northern Ireland JRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUthe volunteers 
could be justified as a necessary measure for raising the force in an emergency, but he did not 
think it possible as a lasting arrangement for two main reasons: firstly, because Stormont was 
constitutionally responsible for internal law and order, not defence, and, secondly, because 
µOR\DO&DWKROLFV¶ZHUHXQZLOOLQJWRMRLQDIRUFHZKLFKWKH\VDZDVDGPLQLVWHUHGE\DVHFWDULDQ
government.61 In reply, however, David Margesson, the newly appointed Secretary of State 
IRU:DURXWOLQHGWKHDUP\¶Vposition, emphasising the need to remain apolitical, stating that 
µRQWKHJURXQGVRIERWKPLOLWDU\HIILFLHQF\DQGRIWKHDEVROXWHQHFHVVLW\RIQRWLQYROYLQJWKH
army in the religious animosities of Ireland, we should not offer to take over this force, and I 
am not at all disposed to make any ZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKLVSRVLWLRQRISULQFLSOH¶62 It was 
0RUULVRQ¶V second reason that became the biggest sticking point for any transfer of authority, 
the overwhelming opinion in London being that the army should avoid any controversies 
which might arise from such a transfer. Sir John Anderson, the Lord President, justified such 
a decision by noting that at the time the U.H.G. was not being used for defence purposes by 
the Northern Ireland government and, in fact, was only training and equipping for the task in 
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the event of invasion.63 The outcome was perhaps best summed up by Churchill who noted 
that the subject was no longer in the public eye, there was no need to publicise it, and thus, in 
KLVYLHZLWZDVµEHWWHUWROHWVOHHSLQJGRJVOLH¶64 
S.P. Mackenzie has noted that 6WRUPRQW¶Vinvolving the British government in any 
decision with regard to the future of the force made the latter into a scapegoat should any 
problems arise.65 However, the Northern Ireland government could not itself make any 
decision on the administration of the U.H.G. which involved the army, under the sole control 
of the British authorities. Even if the Northern Ireland government did not wish for a transfer 
to military control to take place, it would still have been required to seek guidance from the 
Imperial government as to how to proceed. Craigavon had caused difficulties in May 1940 by 
acting in an independent manner, but, after all, Stormont had to make preparations to defend 
its territory during this difficult phase of the war, and surely had no other option than to raise 
and expand a force through the U.S.C., when the regular military were not in a position to do 
so adequately and the Westminster government simply could not and did not want to involve 
itself in Northern Irish defence. As Robert Fisk has intimated, political expediency played a 
SDUWLQ&UDLJDYRQ¶VLQLWLDOGHFLVLRQto secure DµOR\DO¶ERG\RImen, required to undertake an 
important task.66 However, once Craigavon had decided that a local force was to be 
established, the only means of facilitating this was through the U.S.C., an organisation which 
had the administrative means at its disposal and that would be politically reliable. 
In Northern Ireland, the decision made by the Imperial government to maintain the 
status quo was outlined in Cabinet, but Northern Irish ministers sought to make sure that the 
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decision was not made public right away. A discussion was also held which made it clear that 
in Belfast the demand for a change in authority had diminished since new military equipment 
had been provided.67 MacDermott remained unhappy about this arrangement, but it was not 
to change and, as has been argued by Fisk, the situation meant that the Imperial government 
had pressed the Northern Ireland government into maintaining an unconstitutional 
arrangement, which had the result of strengthening the sectarian nature of the force.68 This is 
largely true but, of course, the Northern Ireland government had not done itself any favours 
in the way that it had acted when the force had first come into being. 
Although it had been recognised that the U.H.G. would come under the jurisdiction of 
the military in the event on an invasion, even as late as the end of 1941, this had not been 
officially codified. During the summer of 1941, discussions were still in progress with regard 
to the possibility of eventually separating the U.H.G. from the U.S.C., but these did not 
progress.69 Eventually, however, the British government drafted a Defence Regulation which 
officially denied the existence of the U.H.G., except as Special Constabulary members, but 
stated that they would come officially under military control should an emergency arise.70 As 
a result of this, members of the force were required to undertake a new declaration which 
stated their liability to fall under military control in the event of invasion, resulting in them 
being subject to military law.71 This also outlined that they were only required to serve in 
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Northern Ireland.72 These points were, undoubtedly, crucial to the future organisation of the 
force, and went some way towards satisfying the various parties concerned, although this did 
not mean that these problems went away. The British attorney-general, Donald Somervell, for 
example, still emphasised the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between the 
police and the armed forces, to make matters easier should an emergency occur.73 Even 
within the U.H.G. itself, when compiling notes with relation to the history of the force, it was 
stated that any mention of the µB¶ Special connection should be avoided.74 It appeared, 
though, that this was the most satisfactory settlement that was likely to occur. 
In line with these changes, over time the U.H.G. was placed on a more military 
footing. For example, military nomenclature was adopted universally across the province; it 
had already been in use in Belfast.75 Military ranks were also formally adopted, although it 
was made clear that when situations placed those U.H.G. officers of corresponding rank with 
those in the regular forces, the latter would take precedence in authority.76 Arrangements 
were made for the re-arming of the force with a better quality rifle (they had been training 
with former U.V.F. arms), as this was seen as one of the greatest recruiting tools.77 Even as 
early as September 1941, there were also enquiries as to whether the U.H.G. could be issued 
with Rolls-Royce armoured cars left by the North Irish Horse, who had been re-equipped, but 
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this was rejected.78 In many respects though, it was clear that the U.H.G. found itself in a 
more favourable position in terms of equipment than its counterpart in Great Britain.79 
 
IV 
From its inception, the U.H.G. experienced a number of difficulties which the Home Guard in 
Great Britain did not have to deal with, and these remained until the latter years of the war. 
Having initially been excluded from the original home defence scheme, &UDLJDYRQ¶V
persistence in his efforts to form an equivalent force in Northern Ireland had brought about a 
number of additional sectarian and constitutional problems for his government, as well as for 
the Imperial authorities. Once &UDLJDYRQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRFUHDWHWKHIRUFH had been made, 
however, the only viable option was to utilise the U.S.C. as the foundation on which to 
establish it. Doing so meant that the force was more politically reliable in the eyes of the 
Stormont administration, a point made strongly by Fisk, while the U.S.C. provided a solid 
basis, from a military perspective, for the speedy creation of the new force in the pressurised 
situation in May 1940. Predictably this meant that the U.H.G. became an almost exclusively 
Protestant organisation, so continuing the Protestant volunteering tradition, which existed as 
far back as the seventeenth century and had been manifested in the Volunteers, yeomanry, 
U.V.F., and many other paramilitary organisations. This led to accusations of sectarianism 
from a variety of voices, and became a real concern for the British government and the army, 
which understandably wished to avoid any sectarian controversy. Handing over control to the 
army might have solved some of these problems, but the decision to do this only when an 
invasion occurred meant the force was put in a position whereby it felt as though it was 
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QRERG\¶VEDE\. As no invasion did occur, this is how the situation remained until the force 
was stood down in December 1944.80 
In addition to accusations of sectarianism, the U.H.G. was placed in a rather awkward 
constitutional position. Under the Government of Ireland Act, the Stormont administration 
had no authority on matters of home defence. It did, however, have the power to raise a 
police force as a way to maintain law and order. Still, the U.H.G., although formed as part of 
the U.S.C., was entrusted solely with home defence. This bothered J.C. MacDermott, the 
Minister for Home Affairs, more than any other person and he made repeated appeals to the 
Northern Ireland cabinet, as well as the British army and government, to take over control of 
the force. After much discussion, the decision was made to allow control of the force to 
remain with Stormont. The most important outcome of this decision was that members would 
not necessarily have been treated as franc-tireurs by an enemy force which landed in Ulster. 
Criticisms were continually levelled against the force throughout the war, but in the 
dark days of May 1940, raising it through the administration of the U.S.C. was the only 
viable option, and thereafter it was no surprise that the army wished to have little to do with 
the force. Ultimately, the British Government could not risk entangling itself with the 
religious affairs of Northern Ireland when it was fighting a war of such enormous 
magnitude.81 
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